The Rise and Fall(?) of the Israel-Turkey Alliance

Turkey was one of Israel’s most important allies. Then came the raid on the Mavi Marmara. Two views from Ankara and Jerusalem

Israel’s raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara as it tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, has drawn international attention to the Israel-Turkey alliance. The story is more than a clash between Israel’s conservative Likud government and Turkey’s Islamist-influenced Justice and Development Party (AKP), although it is that, too. It is a tale of a strategic partnership between two outliers in the region, fueled by shared security concerns and complementary economies.

In 1949, Turkey—a modern democracy with a secularist military that was willing to intervene to keep it that way—was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Israel. Despite its largely Sunni Muslim population and the disapproval of its Arab neighbors, Turkey kept business and diplomatic channels open with Israel, though not on the ambassadorial level.

The breakup of the Soviet Union followed by the Oslo Accords emboldened Turkey’s leaders to upgrade their ties with Israel to an alliance and appoint an ambassador, moves welcomed and encouraged by the United States. The 1990s saw massive military sales by Israel to Turkey, groundbreaking joint military exercises and booming bilateral commerce. The relationship stayed strong even after the anti-Zionist Justice and Development Party came into power in 2002. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, known for his coolness toward Israel, pursued back-channel peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, and in December of 2008 warmly welcomed then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Ankara.

The 2009 Gaza war, during which over 1,000 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed, incensed the Turkish public and leadership. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Erdogan lashed out at Israel’s President Shimon Peres. “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill,” Erdogan accused Peres, and later stormed off the stage. Turkey also canceled Israel’s participation in a Turkish-U.S.-Israel military exercise.

Then came the Mavi Marmara affair, setting off a new round of pro-Gazan demonstrations in Turkey and increasingly hostile rhetoric on both sides. There are some hopeful signs: Turkey has not suspended its upcoming purchase of drone planes from Israel, and Turkey’s deputy prime minister has said that the low point in relations is not akin to declaring war. But can the Israel-Turkey alliance return to its previous strength after this latest and most serious setback? We hear from Anat Lapidot-Firilla, a senior research fellow and academic director of the Mediterranean Unit at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, and Ilker Ayturk, an assistant professor of political science at Ankara’s Bilkent University.

What has the Israel-Turkey alliance been based on?

Anat Lapidot-Firilla

There was a very close collaboration between Israel and Turkey from 1995/1996 until today. It started after the Madrid Conference and became stronger after the Oslo Accords. Until then, we didn’t have a Turkish ambassador here. The reason for the upgrade had nothing to do with Israel specifically or the Palestinians but was about strengthening Turkish ties to the United States, which was seen as the only superpower after the fall of the Soviet Union and the only state with anything to say in this region. Turkey really wanted to improve relations with the United States, and Israel was seen as a channel to the United States. Another reason for the alliance has to do with the Israeli need to sell security-related technology and knowledge and the Turkish need to acquire those technologies.

Ilker Ayturk

Turkey’s ties to Israel are pegged to Israel’s relationship with the Arab world and the Palestinians. The Oslo process convinced the Turkish government then that further cooperation with Israel would not alienate the Arab-Muslim world. The 1990s also witnessed a flare-up in the conflict between the Turkish military and the Kurdish separatist movement, PKK, whose leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resided in Damascus. The Turkish leadership increased pressure on the Syrians by establishing an alliance with Israel. Moreover, there has always been considerable sympathy for Israel among secular Turks, particularly among the staunchly secular military. Israelis are admired for their military, economic and technological prowess, for surviving astonishingly in a nasty neighborhood and for being a successful example of non-western modernization.

What are the deeper reasons behind the decline of the relationship?

Anat Lapidot-Firilla

At the end of the 19th and into the 20th century, Turkey was the Ottoman Empire and possessed vast territory in Europe and the Middle East. But it emerged from World War I with only Anatolia. With its return to the Balkans as part of NATO in 1999, a revival of ethno-politics led Turkey to devise what are called neo-Ottoman policies. Many in Turkey feel today that Turkey can play the role that it played in the past. In order to position itself as a regional power, Turkey must push aside Israel and establish credibility in the Arab world. Secondly, a serious social and cultural battle between secularists and the religious in Turkey has become a foreign policy battleground, since the Turkish constitution demands separation between politics and religion in internal affairs. It’s a political issue: The Justice and Development Party’s strategy has been to connect Israeli policies on Palestinians to the policies of the secular old elite.

Ilker Ayturk

Most of the factors which made the Israeli-Turkish alliance possible in the 1990s disappeared one by one after 2000. First, the failure of the Camp David talks in that year and the uncontrollable deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the aftermath of the Second Intifada made Turkish leaders extremely sensitive to Arab-Muslim public opinion. Under those circumstances, Turkish policymakers perceived their ties with Israel as a burden and a source of embarrassment. Second, while the Israeli-Turkish alliance squeezed Syria into submission and succeeded in eliminating Syria’s PKK card, the very success of this alliance ironically removed a building block of the alliance itself. Finally, electoral victories of the AKP government in Turkey after 2002 signaled a gradual shift of power from the secular military to a conservative, mildly Islamist elite, which adopted a pragmatic but instinctively cool approach toward Israel.

Do Israel and Turkey still need each other?

Anat Lapidot-Firilla

Both need good relations, or at least stable ones, because both face problems with Iran but is competing with it for hegemony in the region. Turkey, unlike Israel, may have a policy of negotiation and cooperation, but it is competing with Iran for hegemony in the region. They’re most probably going to collide. Iran is going to have a nuclear bomb soon, and since Turkey is far from getting one, Turkey will become an underdog. Plus, Turkey needs stability and peace in the region because it wants to become a strong economic player. Cooperation between Israel and Turkey could bring prosperity. At the moment Turkey’s exports are growing in the region, far ahead of Israel’s. However, Israel’s trade with North America is higher, and Turkey through Israel could gain in that market. Israel is a high-tech economy and Turkey has a low- and medium-tech economy. Other mutual interests include intelligence, industries and civil society. Another reason has to do with the U.S. Israel and Turkey are the two anchor states for the U.S. in the region. They are both more or less democratic, and were, at least in the recent past, very pro-American. Good relations means stability in the region to some extent. The last thing the U.S. needs now, when it has to deal with Iran and its troops in Iraq, are problems between Turkey and Israel. So I think the U.S. expects the two states to ease the tension.

Ilker Ayturk

Turkey does not attach great importance right now to preserving the former level of cooperation with Israel as long as there is no tangible progress in solving the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. This attitude partly stems from the perception in Ankara that the Netanyahu government’s fixation on Iran and its heavy-handed approach to the Palestinians have isolated Israel in the international arena, and that, therefore, Israel would not dare to alienate and lose Turkey as well. Israel, on the other hand, which has always been the junior party in this relationship, needs Turkey more. Maintaining full diplomatic relations and a strategic partnership with Turkey, a major Muslim and regional power, is an important foreign policy objective for Israel. From the Israeli perspective, partnership with Turkey was the unexpected but most valuable outcome of the Oslo process. In addition, cooperation between the Israeli and Turkish militaries and the intelligence services is known to have reached a cordial level since the 1990s. The use of air and naval bases in Turkey has contributed to the training of IDF officers. On top of that, Mossad must especially appreciate Turkish intelligence reports from regions that Israel finds difficult to reach, such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

What, if anything, can be done to repair the Israel-Turkey alliance?

Anat Lapidot-Firilla

I think that the link between the flotilla incident and the Turkish government has been exaggerated in Israel. There is definitely a remote connection because of the flotilla’s ownership by the municipality of Istanbul, which is part of the AKP. The Turkish government definitely supported the flotilla’s goals because it wanted to embarrass and push Israel to show the masses in the Middle East that Turkey is the only legitimate representative of the true Muslim plurality. But I don’t think Turkey expected violence. It was not planned. But, of course, Israel’s reaction played into the wrong hands. And the fact that Turkish citizens died made it easier for Turkey to further manipulate the incident, to call the Muslim world against Israel and to prove that it is an uncivilized state.

Both Turkey and Israel are now in a place where it is very difficult for either to admit that it was wrong or to apologize, because you’re talking about politicians who need to be elected again. There is a need for a lot of quiet diplomacy here among the United States, Israel and Turkey. There is a need for strong American pressure on Turkey to stop the campaign against Israel; it will not benefit anyone. If Turkey wanted to free Gaza, it didn’t manage to do that. There is a need to press Israel to start some kind of a political initiative in the region that would ease the tension as well, to acknowledge Israel’s need for security but to explain at the same time that something must be done regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The situation cannot continue like this forever. If there is progress in the Israeli political scenery vis-à-vis the Palestinians, then Turkey will have no excuse to continue its aggressive campaign against Israel. It will allow them to retreat from their position without losing face. They will be able to say, “OK, things are getting better, let’s give it a try.”

Ilker Ayturk

In an article I wrote in the aftermath of the Davos fracas, I quoted Ecclesiastes 3:7 to express my optimism about the future of the Israeli-Turkish alliance: If that was a time to rend, there would come a time to sew. My conclusion that there was enough political will in both countries to maintain the alliance was too optimistic. Not only is the bilateral relationship completely rent, now it is also soiled with blood. The Mavi Marmara affair has changed the parameters. This is the first time in republican Turkish history that Turkish civilians—though it is hard to call them non-combatants—have been killed by foreign troops. It changes the rules of the game and will have two important consequences. First, because Turkish civilians were killed by Israeli troops, many Turks believe that Turkey has become a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict, something they had watched from a distance. Second, Turkish public opinion, traditionally apathetic about Turkey’s alliance with Israel, has now decisively turned against it. It is true that the current AKP government and Erdogan have contributed their share to the escalation of this crisis since the beginning of 2009. Yet, as things stand now, it is unrealistic to expect any Turkish government to restore relations to normal unless Israel apologizes officially, pays indemnity to the families of those who were killed and accepts the mandate of an international team of investigators. In mid-June, the Turkish government announced that it will not send an ambassador to Tel Aviv—the former ambassador was called back home in January—until Israel meets those demands. Progress in peace talks on the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian tracks might change the course of events in the medium term. A big positive step forward toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians, or Israelis and Syrians, will again whet Turkey’s appetite for closer ties.